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685 
CONFRONTATION AS CONSTITUTIONAL 
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE:  
CRAWFORD’S BIRTH DID NOT REQUIRE 
THAT ROBERTS HAD TO DIE 
Robert P. Mosteller* 
INTRODUCTION 
This essay has changed in basic nature between when it was 
first presented at this symposium. It was initially about the 
conflict between the Confrontation Clause in Ohio v. Roberts,1 
which provided the basis for Confrontation Clause analysis for 
over two decades, and the Clause as seen in the 2004 decision, 
Crawford v. Washington.2 I had no doubt that Crawford was 
dominant, and virtually no question that Justice Scalia intended 
to vanquish Roberts completely. 
The issue was whether, as a matter of constitutional criminal 
procedure, Roberts “had to die.” My conclusion was that 
Roberts was in very good company when one looks at the 
general range of modern constitutional criminal procedure 
doctrines derived from the Fourth, Fifth, and Sixth 
Amendments. In particular, I believed that Idaho v. Wright,3 
                                                          
* Chadwick Professor of Law, Duke Law School. I wish to thank Craig 
Bradley, Erwin Chemerinsky, Randy Jonakait, Rick Lempert, Roger Kirst, 
Jeff Powell, and Andy Taslitz for their helpful comments on an earlier draft 
of this essay. I also wish to thank the participants in the Brooklyn Law 
School Symposium for lively debate and helpful insight, and my research 
assistant Allison Hester-Haddad. 
1 448 U.S. 56 (1980). 
2 541 U.S. 36 (2004). 
3 497 U.S. 805 (1990). 
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which rested on Roberts, contains an important concept worthy 
of continued life—unreliable and accusatory hearsay should be 
required to pass at least a minimal screening process under the 
Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment before it could be 
used against a criminal defendant without confrontation. I hoped 
that Roberts would be allowed to continue to provide 
supplementary protection for nontestimonial hearsay that was 
facially problematic and that this essay might in some small way 
provide support for Roberts’ continued life within the federal 
Confrontation Clause. The preceding paragraph is written 
largely in the past tense. This is because as I was completing the 
editing of this essay, the Supreme Court decided Whorton v. 
Bockting,4 which states in unmistakable terms that Roberts is 
dead and that the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment 
has no role in excluding unreliable hearsay that is 
nontestimonial.5 
When I read the Bockting opinion, it brought to mind a story 
from my first year at Yale Law School. A friend there, let me 
call him Dave, had many interests outside of legal studies. As 
we approached our first semester exams, some classmates 
worried that Dave had not spent the necessary hours studying. 
He entered one particularly difficult exam, and to everyone’s 
amazement, he almost immediately began writing on the very 
lengthy and difficult single question that comprised the exam. 
He later told us he began writing quickly in order to avoid 
panic. Unfortunately for Dave, deep into the exam, he learned 
of the death of the party around whom he had structured his 
exam answer. Judging correctly that it was too late to start over, 
Dave tore a page from his bluebook, wrote on it “had X not 
died,” placed that piece of paper in the front of his bluebook, 
and kept writing. There was nothing else that could be done. 
Fortunately, Yale’s first semester exams are pass/fail, and Dave 
passed. He has gone on to be a very successful attorney. I now 
figuratively insert that bluebook page, and suggest that readers 
examine this essay as they would “had Roberts not died.” 
                                                          
4 127 S. Ct. 1173 (2007). 
5 See infra notes 51-53 and accompanying text. 
MOSTELLER.DOC 9/4/2007 10:41 PM 
 CONFRONTATION AS CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 687 
After the strong suggestion in Davis of Roberts’ demise, I 
did not entirely understand the apparent happiness of liberal 
leaning academics. I believe Roberts’ death should be mourned 
rather than celebrated. The end of such supplemental protection 
under the federal Constitution is unfortunate, and it makes this 
essay in many ways an “academic” exercise, which it 
presumably will be during my lifetime with regard to the federal 
Constitution. I nevertheless recommend this essay and what is 
now a thought experiment to readers as part of Roberts’ decent 
burial. Moreover, the arguments presented here are not 
irrelevant. State supreme courts have the power to preserve 
Roberts-type protection under their states’ confrontation clauses, 
which need not move in lockstep with the United States Supreme 
Court, particularly when that Court goes beyond the clarity of 
historical sources and ignores important values. Additionally, 
now that the Supreme Court has stated that unreliability is not a 
direct concern of the Sixth Amendment’s Confrontation Clause, 
as matters of policy, the legislatures can and should structure 
statutory protections to guard against unreliable nontestimonial 
hearsay. 
The basic Crawford approach, whether or not precisely 
correct in formulation,6 remedies an inadequacy in constitutional 
protection of the core confrontation right. Accordingly, I do not 
disagree with the proposition that Crawford is roughly “right.” 
However, I do not accept that Roberts was all wrong in 
providing lesser supplementary protection outside the core 
concerns embodied in the testimonial concept. Given the obvious 
and widely recognized inadequacy of Roberts’ protection for the 
confrontation right, one might wonder why—or whether—the 
decision would have been worth preserving.7 I was in fact most 
                                                          
6 See generally Robert P. Mosteller, Softening of the Formality and 
Formalism of the “Testimonial” Statement Concept, 19 REGENT U. L. REV. 
429 (2007) (discussing some of the advances of Davis against the possibility 
of an extremely formal and formalistic definition but also noting some of the 
remaining problems with even a “softened” definition anchored in formality). 
7 I am not alone in finding value in its residual protections. See Laird C. 
Kirkpatrick, Nontestimonial Hearsay After Crawford, Davis, and Bockting, 
19 REGENT U. L. REV. 367 (2007) (arguing the multiple ways that Roberts 
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concerned with preserving Wright, which has not been officially 
interred, but likely has no future under Crawford.8 
In Wright, the court excluded highly problematic statements 
by a child that were accusatory and secured by leading questions 
asked by a pediatrician, rather than a police officer, as violating 
the Confrontation Clause under Roberts. Situations analogous to 
that in Wright, whether or not declared to involve testimonial 
statements, should but are not likely to be scrutinized under the 
Confrontation Clause.9 Hopefully, such scrutiny (or some 
                                                          
has constrained receipt of problematic hearsay and the unfortunate 
consequences of its total demise). 
8 Of course, it is not possible to know if Wright will be preserved by the 
Supreme Court, but its future is realistically bleak. Its focus is the 
unreliability of the out-of-court statement, which Bockting excludes from 
Confrontation Clause scrutiny.  127 S. Ct. at 1183. Ominously, Scalia had 
not cited Wright at all in either Crawford or Davis, although he cited many 
other recent cases which he endorses in result if not in approach. Crawford, 
541 U.S. at 58-60. Moreover, the case does not exhibit the types of features 
that clearly brings it within the testimonial concept (questioning by a police 
officer), and the private status of the doctor who received the statement and 
the arguable primary purpose of his questioning of the child—to conduct a 
medical examination—would support treating it as nontestimonial. See 
generally Robert P. Mosteller, Testing the Testimonial Concept and 
Exceptions to Confrontation: “A Little Child Shall Lead Them,” 82 IND. L.J. 
919 (2007) (examining the developing consensus among the lower courts to 
include some statements by children, such as those to police officers, within 
the testimonial concept and to exclude others, such as those to doctors, and 
the potential decisive impact of Davis’ focus on the questioner’s “primary 
purpose” in resolving the treatment of children’s statements). 
9 If one had the power to move the Supreme Court toward revision of 
Roberts as a true supplemental protection outside the core defined by 
testimonial statements, rather than its preservation to offer protection against 
highly problematic accusatory hearsay, I might try to reformulate Roberts’ 
dimensions to redefine its relationship to hearsay exceptions, for example, 
and give review under it somewhat more rigor. My sense, however, is that 
mere preservation without reform will be difficult enough, if not impossible. 
I choose here take on one largely hopeless task at a time. Perhaps the 
testimonial statement concept will be developed in future cases to be broad 
enough that many of my concerns about problematic, typically highly 
accusatory hearsay, will be met directly because these problematic statements 
will be defined as testimonial. Despite the largely positive direction of Davis 
in softening the testimonial statement concept in terms of its formality and 
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scrutiny) will continue in some courts and through other legal 
mechanisms. 
Part I and Part II of this essay compare the approaches set 
forth in Crawford and Roberts. I accept that Crawford’s core 
concept may be anchored firmly in constitutional history,10 but 
that did not necessarily render Roberts wrongheaded or an unfit 
constitutional outlier. Of course, originalism dictates that 
Roberts (and likely Wright) must die, but that is equally true of 
much of the rest of modern constitutional criminal procedure 
based on the Bill of Rights. In Part III, I examine the story of 
Sir Walter Raleigh, certain aspects of which the Court relied 
upon in Crawford to establish the new Confrontation Clause 
jurisprudence. However, the Court in that case conveniently 
omitted other problematic hearsay introduced against Raleigh 
history, which lends support to a somewhat broader 
confrontation right.11 Part IV describes the difficulties 
                                                          
formalism, which unfortunately may be almost inherent in a definition built 
around the testimonial concept, I fear a confrontation jurisprudence that 
covers exclusively testimonial statements will be inadequate. See generally 
Mosteller, supra note 6 (noting the positive movement of Davis but the 
uncertainty of the future course of the definition given the continued 
commitment to formality as a necessary element and the difficulty of 
providing appropriately broad coverage of problematic accusatory hearsay 
while remaining at all true to the word “testimonial”). 
10 Although the detail of the Framers’ primary concern is at best difficult 
to pin down and more likely impossible to determine, I believe that at a 
somewhat broader level it is clear that the Confrontation Clause was written 
as part of the effort to reject the inquisitorial model of trial and accordingly 
that it firmly rejected ex parte examinations that were part of the civil-law 
mode of criminal procedure. See Crawford, 541 U.S. at 50. That leads to 
exclusion of “testimonial statements” in their narrow definition, but would 
also extend to other areas, such as accusatorial statements that might provide 
a more useful shorthand. See Robert P. Mosteller, “Testimonial” and the 
Formalistic Definition—the Case for an “Accusatorial” Fix, 20 CRIM. JUST. 
14 (Summer 2005). See generally infra note 94. 
11 In Davis v. Washington, 126 S. Ct. 2266 (2006), Justice Scalia 
focused on one isolated part of the Raleigh story as proof by itself of the 
Framers’ intent: 
The Framers were no more willing to exempt from cross-
examination volunteered testimony or answers to open-ended 
questions than they were to exempt answers to detailed 
MOSTELLER.DOC 9/4/2007 10:41 PM 
690 JOURNAL OF LAW AND POLICY 
confronted in the process of translation that is inherent in the 
originalist approach, and proposes ways of negotiating this 
process. 
I.  THE FUNDAMENTAL DIFFERENCE BETWEEN THE CRAWFORD 
AND ROBERTS APPROACHES 
Crawford’s transformation of confrontation analysis from a 
broad but weak reliability based system to a regime that offers 
far more powerful protection for the narrow class of testimonial 
statements was a stunning development. I begin by describing 
the new system and then set out and critique the old 
methodology. 
A.  The Crawford Approach 
In Crawford, the Supreme Court created a new paradigm for 
Confrontation Clause analysis with regard to the admission of 
out-of-court statements. In an opinion authored by Justice Scalia, 
the Court applied the Clause with real rigor to a subset of such 
out-of-court statements, which it termed “testimonial” 
statements. Relying on history, dictionary definitions, and his 
own brand of originalism, Scalia found support for a focus on 
such statements in the use of the word “witnesses” in the text of 
the Sixth Amendment, which guarantees the accused in a 
criminal case the right “to be confronted with the witnesses 
                                                          
interrogation. (Part of the evidence against Sir Walter Raleigh 
was a letter from Lord Cobham that was plainly not the result of 
sustained questioning. Raleigh’s Case, 2 How St. Tr. 1, 27 
(1603)). 
Id. at 2274 n.1. Surely the Cobham letter is part of the Raleigh story, but we 
have no indication that the Framers thought it particularly significant and 
certainly no indication that the words of the Constitution are designed to 
cover volunteered statements because of the injustice of receiving such 
evidence. Scalia has no more evidence that the Cobham letter should define 
the right than admission of the hearsay accusation from the Portugese 
gentleman, see infra Part IV, which is nontestimonial under his terminology 
and which he conveniently completely ignores. 
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against him.”12 
Justice Scalia observed that history reflected a special 
concern by the Framers for the use of statements that were of a 
“testimonial” character: “[T]he principal evil at which the 
Confrontation Clause was directed was the civil-law mode of 
criminal procedure, and particularly its use of ex parte 
examinations as evidence against the accused.”13 He cited two 
specific examples: first, the use of statements taken from 
accusers by the examining magistrates under the Marian Statutes 
in the sixteenth century,14 and second, the accusations of Lord 
Cobham against Sir Walter Raleigh in his treason trial, who had 
implicated him in both an examination before the Privy Council 
and in a letter to it.15 
With respect to the dictionary and its insight into the 
meaning of the constitutional language, Justice Scalia wrote: 
The text of the Confrontation Clause reflects this 
focus. It applies to “witnesses” against the accused—
in other words, those who “bear testimony.” 
“Testimony,” in turn, is typically “[a] solemn 
declaration or affirmation made for the purpose of 
                                                          
12 U.S. CONST. amend. VI. 
13 Crawford, 541 U.S. at 50. 
14 Id. at 44, 50. 
15 Justice Scalia states that Cobham “had implicated [Raleigh] in an 
examination before the Privy Council and in a letter.” Crawford, 541 U.S. at 
44. Cobham’s accusation was obtained through interrogations in the Privy 
Council on three different occasions. 1 DAVID JARDINE, CRIMINAL TRIALS 
410 n.† (1832) (indicating interrogations on July 16, 19, and 20, 1603). 
Cobham wrote two letters to the Council, which were read at Raleigh’s trial. 
One letter was dated July 29, 1603, which was written after his examination 
on July 20, and was used to “fortify the Lord Cobham’s accusation against” 
Raleigh. Id. at 422-23. The second, a much more damning letter that 
implicated Raleigh directly, was written in November during the trial. Id. at 
444-46. See Robert P. Mosteller, Crawford v. Washington, Encouraging and 
Ensuring the Confrontation of Witnesses, 39 U. Rich. L. Rev. 511, 545 
(2005). Again in Davis, Scalia refers to only one letter, stating “[p]art of the 
evidence against Sir Walter Raleigh was a letter from Lord Cobham that was 
plainly not the result of sustained questioning.” Davis, 126 S. Ct. at 2274 
(citing Raleigh’s Case, 2 How. St. Tr. 1, 27 (1603)). The letter described in 
his cited source is the latter of the two, which directly accuses Raleigh. 
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establishing or proving some fact.” An accuser who 
makes a formal statement to government officers 
bears testimony in a sense that a person who makes a 
casual remark to an acquaintance does not.16 
From these sources and his originalist perspective, Scalia 
adopted the testimonial statement approach. He left for another 
day a comprehensive definition of such statements, stating that 
“it applies at a minimum to prior testimony at a preliminary 
hearing, before a grand jury, or at a former trial; and to police 
interrogations.”17 
The Court slightly amplified the coverage of testimonial 
statements in Davis v. Washington.18 The Court stated that: 
Statements are not testimonial when made in the 
course of police interrogation under circumstances 
objectively indicating that the primary purpose of the 
interrogation is to enable police assistance to meet an 
ongoing emergency. They are testimonial when the 
circumstances objectively indicate that there is no 
such ongoing emergency, and that the primary 
purpose is to establish or prove past events potentially 
relevant to later criminal prosecution.19 
                                                          
16 Crawford, 541 U.S. at 51 (quoting 1 N. WEBSTER, AN AMERICAN 
DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE (1828)). 
17 Id. at 68. 
18 126 S. Ct. 2266 (2006). 
19 Id. at 2273-74. In the formulation of the test in Davis, Scalia appears 
to perform several subtle alterations in his test from the text of Webster’s 
dictionary on which he bases the test. First, he shifts from an apparent focus 
on the intent of the speaker (“made for the purpose of establishing or 
proving”) to that of the police who solicited the statement (“primary purpose 
of the interrogation”), and he de-emphasized the importance of the formality 
of the statement (“a solemn declaration or affirmation”) by applying it to an 
oral statement made in the field to a police officer that Justice Thomas, in 
dissent, believed deviated from the historical examples exemplified by the 
formality of proceedings before the examining magistrates under the Marian 
Statutes. Id. at 2280-82 (Thomas, J., dissenting). See Mosteller, supra note 
6, at 447-49; Robert P. Mosteller, Davis v. Washington and Hammon v. 
Indiana: Beating Expectations, 105 MICH. L. REV. FIRST IMPRESSIONS 6, 7-9 
(2006), http://students.law.umich.edu/mlr/firstimpressions/vol105/mosteller. 
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Crawford set out strict standards for dealing with testimonial 
statements and stated that in order to admit such statements 
without confrontation, “the Sixth Amendment demands what the 
common law required: unavailability and a prior opportunity for 
cross-examination.”20 While the goal of the Confrontation 
Clause is to ensure reliability, it protects as “a procedural rather 
than a substantive guarantee. It commands, not that evidence is 
reliable, but that reliability be assessed in a particular manner: 
by testing in the crucible of cross-examination.”21 Thus, unless a 
testimonial statement fits into one of a limited number of 
exceptions,22 it must be excluded unless the declarant is 
unavailable and the statement was subjected to earlier 
confrontation, or the declarant is brought into the courtroom and 
is subject to cross-examination. 
B.  The Roberts Approach 
Roberts also begins with the words of the Sixth Amendment, 
but reflects a facially far broader notion of the phrase “witnesses 
against him” than Scalia’s interpretation of the phrase in 
Crawford. Justice Blackmun’s opinion for the Court stated: “If 
one were to read this language literally, it would require, on 
objection, the exclusion of any statement made by a declarant 
not at trial.”23 He concluded that, although the Clause “was 
                                                          
pdf. 
20 Crawford, 541 U.S. at 68. 
21 Id. at 61. 
22 Among these limited exceptions are that the statement is not used for 
its truth, Crawford, 541 U.S. at 59 n.9 (citing Tennessee v. Street, 471 U.S. 
409, 414 (1985)), and that the defendant forfeited his right to confrontation 
by wrongdoing, id. at 62 (citing Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 
158-59 (1979)), the latter of which the Court seemed in Davis to encourage 
domestic abuse prosecutors to use. Davis, 126 S. Ct. at 2280. For the other 
exceptions, see 2 MCCORMICK, EVIDENCE § 252, at 163-64 (6th ed. 2006). 
23 Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 63 (1980). I do not consider in my 
treatment of the issue the excellent research and arguments by Professor 
Randy Jonakait that Scalia’s use of the definition offered by Webster for the 
word testimonial is selective and that an equally reasonable definition would 
have covered all hearsay statements as Roberts did. See Randolph N. 
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intended to exclude some hearsay,” an approach that excluded 
virtually every hearsay statement was inconsistent with historical 
practice and had been rejected “as unintended and too 
extreme.”24 Instead, Roberts recognized that the case law had 
established a set of principles that reflected a compromise 
between competing interests: on the one hand, a preference for 
face-to-face confrontation, the right to cross-examination, and a 
concern for accuracy and integrity in the fact-finding process, 
and on the other, concerns of public policy and necessity 
reflected by the need for effective law enforcement and the clear 
formulation of evidentiary rules and procedures.25 
Roberts found that the Confrontation Clause imposes two 
types of requirements.26 First, the Framers’ preference for face-
to-face accusation translated into a requirement that the 
prosecution either produce the declarant or demonstrate his or 
her unavailability.27 Later cases concluded that this was not in 
fact a general requirement, but applied only to a limited class of 
hearsay statements and most clearly only to prior testimony.28 
The second requirement, trustworthiness, proved the more 
lasting and fundamental element of the system. Where 
                                                          
Jonakait, “Witnesses” in the Confrontation Clause: Crawford v. Washington, 
Noah Webster, and Compulsory Process, 79 TEMP. L. REV. 155, 198 (2006). 
Although quite plausible in my judgment, Professor Jonakait’s message is a 
bit more sweeping than my effort simply to say Roberts is within the fold of 
many contemporary criminal procedure protections and should not be rejected 
because of its failure to meet Scalia’s exacting, and I believe, contestable 
standards. 
24 Roberts, 448 U.S. at 63. 
25 Id. at 63-64. 
26 See generally 2 MCCORMICK, supra note 22, § 252, at 159. 
27 Roberts, 448 U.S. at 65. 
28 In United States v. Inadi, 475 U.S. 387, 394 (1986), the Court held 
that unavailability need not be shown for coconspirator statements because 
they have “independent evidentiary significance” that made them superior to 
what could be obtained if the declarant testified at trial. In White v. Illinois, 
502 U.S. 346, 355-56 (1992), the Court applied that rationale to statements 
admitted under the excited utterance and “medical examination” exception, 
and effectively generalized the elimination of the unavailability requirement to 
a large group of hearsay exceptions, including all those in Rule 803 of the 
Federal Rules of Evidence. See 2 MCCORMICK, supra note 22, § 252, at 160. 
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unavailability is shown and no confrontation is provided, 
Roberts looked to the underlying purpose of the Clause “to 
augment accuracy in the fact finding process by ensuring the 
defendant an effective means to test adverse evidence.”29 The 
statement could be introduced if the hearsay was “marked with 
such trustworthiness that ‘there is no material departure from the 
reason of the general rule.’”30 Justice Blackmun’s opinion 
argued that “certain hearsay exceptions rest upon such solid 
foundations that admission of virtually any evidence within them 
comports with the ‘substance of the constitutional protection.’”31 
Hearsay could be introduced without confrontation if judged to 
be trustworthy because that judgment was seen as making cross-
examination unnecessary. 
The opinion’s reliability test was formulated as follows: 
“Reliability can be inferred without more in a case where the 
evidence falls within a firmly rooted hearsay exception. In other 
cases, the evidence must be excluded, at least absent a showing 
of particularized guarantees of trustworthiness.”32 
C.  Critique of Roberts 
Leaving aside for a moment Crawford’s scorn for Roberts,33 
the Roberts system of confrontation analysis is rather easily 
criticized on a number of levels. In terms of its effectiveness as 
protection for defendants either to enforce a guarantee of 
confrontation, which I suggest should be the primary goal of the 
Clause,34 or to exclude unreliable hearsay in the absence of 
confrontation, which is a necessary remedy for violation and an 
inducement to providing confrontation, it was largely a failure. 
While in theory the confrontation right under Roberts provided 
broad coverage, it often resulted in scant protection as a 
                                                          
29 448 U.S. at 65. 
30 Id. at 65 (quoting Synder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 107 (1934)). 
31 Id. at 66 (quoting Mattox v. United States, 156 U.S. 237, 244 
(1895)). 
32 Id. at 66. 
33 See infra, notes 39-41 and accompanying text. 
34 See generally Mosteller, supra note 6. 
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practical matter.35 
For hearsay other than prior testimony, the rights of face-to-
face confrontation and cross-examination were easily ignored 
when faced with hearsay other than prior testimony. Roberts and 
its progeny allowed the prosecution to admit most hearsay that 
fell within established hearsay exceptions without any effort to 
produce even readily available declarants.36 It required 
absolutely no showing of trustworthiness for statements admitted 
under the long list of established hearsay exceptions that Roberts 
itself colorfully lampooned as “‘an old-fashioned crazy quilt 
made of patches cut from a group of paintings by cubists, 
futurists and surrealists,’”37 and allowed ad hoc balancing for 
the scrutinized statements that fell within non-traditional 
exceptions or problematic expansions of traditional exceptions. 
Only occasionally did Roberts provide protection even 
against facially problematic hearsay. The Supreme Court 
excluded hearsay in several cases involving accusatory 
statements by co-defendants under police interrogation admitted 
as statements against interest,38 and in Wright,39 the Court 
excluded highly accusatory statements secured by leading 
questions from a child witness/victim, which in the lower courts 
had been admitted under Idaho’s catch-all exception. 
Crawford described Roberts’ departure from historical 
principles as twofold. First, Roberts was too broad in that it 
applied to hearsay that was not ex parte testimony and thus was 
“far removed from the core concern of the clause;” it was also 
                                                          
35 See Mosteller, supra note 6, at 6 (describing briefly the weaknesses of 
Roberts and comparing it to the more vigorous protections provided by 
Crawford for an important group of problematic hearsay statements, but 
considering Roberts “better than nothing” and occasionally offering protection 
from problematic hearsay). 
36 2 MCCORMICK, supra note 22, § 252, at 159-60. 
37 Roberts, 448 U.S. at 62 (quoting Edmund M. Morgan & John M. 
Maguire, Looking Backward and Forward at Evidence, 50 HARV. L. REV. 
909, 921 (1937)). 
38 See Lilly v. Virginia, 527 U.S. 116 (1999); Lee v. Illinois, 476 U.S. 
530 (1986). 
39 Idaho v. Wright, 497 U.S. 805 (1990). 
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too narrow in that it often admitted ex parte testimony under a 
malleable reliability standard, which “often fail[ed] to protect 
against paradigmatic confrontation violations.”40 Crawford 
repeatedly criticized Roberts as effectively standardless, stating 
accurately, for example, that “[r]eliability is an amorphous, if 
not entirely subjective, concept.”41 Second, and more damning, 
was Roberts’ admission of “core testimonial statements that the 
Confrontation Clause plainly meant to exclude,” referring here 
to accusatory statements made by a co-defendant under police 
interrogation, which the Court in Lilly v. Virginia42 had earlier 
indicated was highly problematic.43 This failure is truly damning 
for Roberts as a primary test for guaranteeing confrontation. 
Later in the term, in United States v. Gonzalez-Lopez,44 
Scalia returned to a criticism of Roberts’ “functional” approach 
in a case concerning another aspect of the Sixth Amendment—
whether denial of a defendant’s right to appointed counsel of his 
choice was subject to harmless error analysis if it did not 
undermine the fairness of the trial. He stated: 
What the Government urges upon us here is what was 
urged upon us (successfully, at one time . . .) with 
regard to the Sixth Amendment’s right of 
confrontation—a line of reasoning that “abstracts 
from the right to its purposes, and then eliminates the 
right.”45 
                                                          
40 Crawford, 541 U.S. at 60. 
41 Id. at 63. 
42 527 U.S. 116 (1999) (ruling that admission of non-testifying 
accomplice’s confession violated confrontation right under Roberts). 
43 Crawford, 541 U.S. at 63 (observing that despite the Lilly plurality’s 
suggestion that accomplice confessions could not survive under Roberts 
analysis, Lilly, 527 U.S. at 137, courts continued to routinely admit such 
statements). The Court cited a study by Roger Kirst that accomplice 
statements were admitted more than one-third of the time in the seventy-five 
cases he examined. Roger W. Kirst, Appellate Court Answers to the 
Confrontation Question in Lilly v. Virginia, 53 Syracuse L. Rev. 87, 104-05 
(2003). 
44 126 S. Ct. 2557 (2006). 
45 Id. at 2562 (citing Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56 (1980); Maryland v. 
Craig, 497 U.S. 836, 862 (1990) (Scalia, J., dissenting)). 
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As noted above, Scalia’s opinion in Crawford indicated clear 
displeasure with Roberts, and he raised the issue of its survival 
by first observing that the analysis in Crawford had cast doubt 
on the decision in White v. Illinois,46 inter alia, not to limit the 
Confrontation Clause to testimonial statements. However, he 
avoided resolution of the issue because the Court was not 
required to decide its survival as to nontestimonial statements in 
order to rule that a new system applied to testimonial statements 
such as those in Crawford.47 Near the end of his opinion in 
Crawford, Scalia allowed that as to nontestimonial hearsay, “it 
is wholly consistent with the Framers’ design to afford the States 
flexibility in their development of hearsay law—as does 
Roberts.”48 But again he raised the specter of total obliteration, 
noting that “an approach that exempted such statements from 
Confrontation Clause scrutiny altogether would also provide 
such flexibility.”49 
The continued viability of Roberts was not directly at issue 
in the consolidated cases of Davis and Hammon, the Supreme 
Court’s second decision under its new paradigm, because 
admission of the statements in Davis and Hammon did not turn 
on Roberts’ application. The statements in Hammon were 
excluded because they were found to be testimonial, despite 
Roberts’ acceptance of those statements. 
The situation in Hammon was precisely the same as in 
Crawford, where the Court effectively overruled Roberts as to 
statements in the core area of confrontation concern, but left it 
unaffected outside that core.50 In Davis, other statements were 
ruled admissible under the Confrontation Clause because they 
were considered nontestimonial. Roberts would likewise have 
admitted those statements because they fit within a firmly rooted 
hearsay rule—excited utterances.51 Thus, under both Crawford 
                                                          
46 502 U.S. 346, 352-53 (1992). 
47 541 U.S. at 61. 
48 Id. at 68. 
49 Id. 
50 Id. at 61, 68. 
51 In its opinion in State v. Davis, 111 P.3d 844 (Wash. 2005), the 
Supreme Court of Washington noted that “[r]elying on Ohio v. Roberts . . . , 
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and Roberts the results would have been identical to that in 
Davis, and no occasion would arise to rule on the continued 
validity of Roberts. 
Nevertheless, again in an opinion by Scalia, the Davis Court 
signaled its displeasure with Roberts and announced its demise, 
albeit somewhat obscurely. The opinion stated: “It is the 
testimonial character of the statement that separates it from other 
hearsay that, while subject to traditional limitations upon hearsay 
evidence, is not subject to the Confrontation Clause.”52 Also, 
referring to its focus on testimonial hearsay in Crawford, it 
stated: “A limitation so clearly reflected in the text of the 
constitutional provision must fairly be said to mark out not 
merely its ‘core,’ but its perimeter.”53 Thus, in dicta, Davis laid 
Roberts to rest and declared the Confrontation Clause 
inapplicable to hearsay that is not testimonial. Although I 
recognized that even dicta can sound the death knell of a 
previous holding, I hoped it was more than an “academic” 
exercise to argue for its survival.54 
                                                          
the Court of Appeals held that the trial court properly classified the 911 call 
as an excited utterance, which is a firmly rooted exception to the hearsay rule 
and thus satisfies the requirements of reliability.” Id. at 847. Davis did not 
challenge the correctness of the determination that the Confrontation Clause 
had not been violated in Roberts. See Brief for the Petitioner, Davis v. 
Washington, 126 S. Ct. 2266 (2006) (No. 05-5224) (citing Roberts at three 
points but not relying on it in any fashion to support reversal of the 
conviction). 
52 Davis, 126 S. Ct. at 2273. 
53 Id. at 2274. 
54 Although Scalia’s statements about Roberts’ demise were arguably 
clear, the early decisions by lower courts were not uniform after Davis and 
prior to Bockting. United States v. Thomas, 453 F.3d 838, 844 (7th Cir. 
2006), State v. Davis, 148 P.3d 510, 515-16 (Kan. 2006), and State v. Blue, 
717 N.W.2d 558, 565 (N.D. 2006), state that Roberts continues to apply to 
nontestimonial statements. However, United States v. Tolliver, 454 F.3d 660, 
665 n.2 (7th Cir. 2006), which was decided by the same circuit as Thomas 
shortly after it, noted that Davis “appears to have resolved the issue, holding 
that nontestimonial hearsay is not subject to the Confrontation Clause” but 
found it unnecessary to address the issue because there was no dispute that if 
the statements were nontestimonial the Clause was not violated, and United 
States v. Felix, 467 F.3d 227, 231 (2d Cir. 2006), ruled that Davis made it 
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Whorton v. Bockting55 unmistakably buries Roberts and 
makes its destruction and the elimination of any supplemental 
protection to nontestimonial hearsay part of the reasoning of the 
case, which cannot be characterized as dicta. Bockting 
repeatedly states, without limitation, that Crawford overruled 
Roberts.56 However, the most telling and significant portion of 
the opinion explains why Crawford does not implicate the 
fundamental fairness and accuracy of the trial and therefore 
should not be considered a “watershed rule” that would make it 
retroactive. 
The Court stated: 
With respect to testimonial out-of-court statements, 
Crawford is more restrictive than was Roberts, and 
this may improve the accuracy of fact-finding in some 
criminal cases. Specifically, under Roberts, there may 
have been cases in which courts erroneously 
determined that testimonial statements were 
reliable. . . . But whatever improvement in reliability 
Crawford produced in this respect must be considered 
together with Crawford’s elimination of Confrontation 
Clause protection against the admission of unreliable 
out-of-court nontestimonial statements. Under 
Roberts, an out-of-court nontestimonial statement not 
subject to prior cross-examination could not be 
admitted without a judicial determination regarding 
reliability. Under Crawford, on the other hand, the 
                                                          
clear that confrontation only applied to testimonial statements. See generally 
James J. Duane, The Crypotographic Coroner’s Report on Ohio v. Roberts, 
21 CRIM. JUST. 37 (Fall 2006) (describing correctly the demise of Roberts 
albeit by cryptic statements in Davis). Whether the justices who joined 
Scalia’s opinion recognized fully the import of his language, and more 
importantly, whether they appreciated the implications of that statement for a 
case like Wright is a matter of some uncertainty. I recognize these are thin 
reeds on which to depend, but they provide some possibilities for the future. 
55 127 S. Ct. 1173 (2007). 
56 Id. at 1179, 1182-83. These statements seem plainly inaccurate as to 
nontestimonial statements. In Crawford, the Court stated on that issue that 
“we need not definitively resolve whether it survives our decision today.” 
541 U.S. at 61. 
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Confrontation Clause has no application to such 
statements and therefore permits their admission even 
if they lack indicia of reliability.57 
Thus, Bockting frees nontestimonial hearsay from scrutiny 
under the federal Confrontation Clause and lays Roberts to rest. 
Now, I turn to either what might have been “had Roberts not 
died” and to an examination of what state supreme courts and 
legislatures should consider in examining the constitutional and 
statutory protects against unreliable hearsay. 
II.  TWO-PART CONSTITUTIONAL PROTECTION—GREATER 
PROTECTION FOR THE CORE RIGHT AND LESSER PROTECTION FOR 
A FUNCTIONALLY RELATED PROBLEM 
Constitutional criminal procedure recognizes doctrines under 
the Fourth, Fifth, and Sixth Amendments that principally protect 
individual from violations by the government of core 
constitutional rights.58 Although inconsistent with strictly 
originalist interpretations and hardly elegant, the Court in the 
second half of the twentieth century, particularly during the 
Warren Court era, expanded these doctrines to protect additional 
areas outside of but related to the core concern.59 In these latter 
                                                          
57 Whorton, 127 S. Ct. at 1183 (emphasis added). 
58 These core rights include the protection of the home against searches 
in the absence of probable cause and a warrant under the Fourth Amendment, 
protection of a suspect against being forced under penalty of contempt to 
testify in court against herself under the Fifth Amendment, and the holding of 
secret trials under the Sixth Amendment.  U.S. CONST. amend IV, V & VI. 
59 As I have read e-mails from my colleagues in evidence scholarship, I 
have been struck by how many of them with liberal political and doctrinal 
leanings seem to embrace with some enthusiasm Justice Scalia’s originalism 
as exhibited in Crawford and Davis. My reaction is different, which I 
attribute to the fact that I am also anchored in criminal procedure, and see the 
potentially quite negative impact of this mode of reasoning on the broad set 
of criminal procedure rights that were created during the Warren Court 
revolution and are largely treated as part of accepted law today. 
 I attribute at least part of this difference between my reaction and what I 
perceive as that of a larger number who appear to welcome Roberts’ demise 
to the fact that within constitutional criminal procedure and even within the 
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situations, something of a functional approach was often used in 
fashioning the dimensions of the expanded modern right,60 
sometimes resulting in a somewhat lower degree of protection 
outside the core right.61 
A strong Crawford-based analysis protecting the core and a 
weaker Roberts-based analysis protecting a broader area would 
                                                          
Sixth Amendment, the Confrontation Clause is studied most carefully by 
evidence scholars rather than criminal procedure scholars. This anomaly has 
been attributed to Dean Henry Wigmore’s impact on the Confrontation 
Clause and his capture of that area of constitutional law by evidence scholars. 
See Howard W. Gutman, Academic Determinism: The Division of the Bill of 
Rights, 54 S. CAL. L. REV. 295, 332-43 (1981). As many scholars have 
noted, this is but one of the consequences of Wigmore’s influence in this 
area, which equated the Confrontation Clause and hearsay doctrine and was 
effectively adopted in Roberts. See, e.g., Robert P. Mosteller, Remaking 
Confrontation Clause and Hearsay Doctrine Under the Challenge of Child 
Sexual Abuse Prosecutions, 1993 U. Ill. L. Rev. 691, 713 (1993). Professor 
Randy Jonakait has made arguments that flow from at least a related 
intuition. He has linked the Confrontation Clause within the Sixth 
Amendment to other criminal procedure rights both as a matter of history and 
of construction. See Jonakait, supra note 23; Randolph N. Jonakait, The 
Origins of the Confrontation Clause: An Alternative History, 27 RUTGERS 
L.J. 77 (1995); Randolph N. Jonakait, Restoring the Confrontation Clause to 
the Sixth Amendment, 35 UCLA L. REV. 557 (1988). 
 The effort to fit Confrontation Clause jurisprudence into a larger pattern 
of constitutional criminal procedure clearly has its difficulties and much 
complicates the story. My contention here is somewhat narrower, however. I 
believe as evidence scholars, we operate at some peril if we embrace 
originalism in the area of confrontation without recognizing its broader 
implications and potential impact on other constitutional rights or if we 
examine the Confrontation Clause totally in isolation from larger theories of 
constitutional law and constitutional criminal procedure. 
60 See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967) (abandoning the 
trespass and property law basis of the Fourth Amendment previously 
employed and protecting conversation in telephone booth, the Court 
recognized the importance of the public telephone in private communication). 
61 Compare New Jersey v. Portash, 450 U.S. 385 (1978) (ruling that as 
to statements obtained in a pure violation of the Fifth Amendment through 
formal compulsion, impeachment was not permitted) with Harris v. New 
York, 401 U.S. 222 (1971) (permitting impeachment with statements obtained 
in violation of the expanded right under Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 
(1966)). 
MOSTELLER.DOC 9/4/2007 10:41 PM 
 CONFRONTATION AS CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 703 
differ principally from the development of other criminal 
procedure doctrines in the chronological order of when the core 
and the secondary rights were recognized. The normal pattern is 
for the core right to be recognized relatively early and to enjoy 
continued protection into the modern era. Additional rights are 
extrapolated from the core right at a later time, and often 
justified as an application of the original intention to the changed 
circumstances of modern life.62 Confrontation Clause protection, 
by contrast, has involved a reversal of the temporal development 
of the otherwise familiar two-part pattern, and perhaps it is this 
distinction that gives Crawford its special attraction for some 
who see it as the only appropriate protection. 
Before 2004, there was a good argument to be made that the 
Confrontation Clause under Roberts provided less protection to 
the areas with which the Framers were particularly concerned. 
While the protection was broader than the Framers had 
envisioned, that was not remarkable in the context of other 
modern rights. More unusual was that the strong protection the 
Framers intended to provide to areas of core concern was not 
effectively guaranteed by the Warren Court or under the Roberts 
decision, and it was not until very recently in Crawford that the 
Court first provided such strong protection. Such a failure of 
core protection is atypical, and in its attractive affirmative 
holding Crawford accomplished the restoration of a 
constitutional commitment to guarantee confrontation. Thus, 
Crawford is “right” to that extent. Its suggested destruction of 
Roberts, however, was of a different character. An originalist 
perspective would call for such a destruction, but no more so 
than for most other expansions of rights in modern criminal 
procedure, such as Miranda,63 which have not been obliterated. 
                                                          
62 See, e.g., Lawrence Lessig, Fidelity in Translation, 71 TEX. L. REV. 
1165 (1993). 
63 384 U.S. 436 (1966). See infra note 64 and accompanying text, see 
also infra notes 66-95 and accompanying text. 
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A.  The Primacy of Constitutional Commitments to Prohibit 
Conduct in Original Intent 
In his book on the structure of constitutional law, Professor 
Jed Rubenfeld64 provides a way to visualize this dichotomy 
between that which is clearly on solid constitutional grounds and 
that which is ahistoric but hardly uncommon or unjustifiable as a 
matter of constitutional interpretation, suggesting an “impossibly 
simple distinction:” 
Specific understandings about a constitutional right 
can take two different forms: There can be specific 
laws or practices that the right is understood to 
prohibit; and there can be specific laws or practices 
that the right is understood not to prohibit. Virtually 
all the important historical understandings of the 
former kind—specific understandings of what a right 
prohibited—are alive and well throughout 
constitutional law, playing a foundational role in the 
doctrine. By contrast, where constitutional doctrine 
has departed from important historical 
understandings, it has virtually always departed from 
understandings of the latter kind—concerning what a 
right did not prohibit.65 
Professor Rubenfeld labels constitutional understandings 
about what constitutional rights are understood to prohibit as 
“Application Understandings,” and he labels the historical 
understanding of what the rights did not prohibit as “No-
Application Understandings.”66 He sees originalism as treating 
all understandings as equally binding, but flawed for that very 
reason.67 Application Understandings are foundational or core 
                                                          
64 JED RUBENFELD, REVOLUTION BY JUDICIARY: THE STRUCTURE OF 
AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (2005). In his review of this book, my 
colleague Jeff Powell finds Rubenfeld’s bold claims about his new method of 
constitutional interpretation quite successful. H. Jefferson Powell, Grand 
Visions in an Age of Conflict, 115 YALE L.J. 2067, 2085-92 (2006). 
65 See RUBENFELD, supra note 64, at 13. 
66 Id. at 14. 
67 Id. at 15. 
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understandings.68 They are fundamental commitments that are 
not to be disregarded, and Rubenfeld believes the pattern of 
cases show they indeed have rarely been disregarded.69 No-
Application Understandings are not “commitments” but are 
rather “intentions,” which can and have been disregarded.70 
Rubenfeld sees judges building frameworks around the 
paradigmatic Applications Understanding, and in that process 
occasionally breaking free from No-Application 
Understandings.71 
B.  Examples of the Dichotomy in Faithfulness to Historical 
Practices in Constitutional Criminal Procedure 
Rubenfeld looks briefly at contemporary constitutional 
criminal procedures, which he characterizes correctly as 
“notoriously untethered to original understandings or 
practices.”72 In this field, the Supreme Court dramatically 
expanded constitutional guarantees governing police procedure 
regarding searches, arrests, and questioning far beyond the 
original understanding, while leaving foundational applications 
intact to play a central role in development of the doctrine.73 
As to the Fourth Amendment, the clearest historical view is 
that the amendment was intended to prohibit “general warrants,” 
which is an Application Understanding. That Understanding 
remains a basis for invalidating insufficiently particularized 
                                                          
68 Id. at 14. The discussion in the text concerns provisions that prohibit, 
which is the nature of most of the Bill of Rights provisions. As to 
constitutional provisions that grant power, Application Understandings are the 
inverse—they are understandings of what that provision authorized. No-
Application Understandings in this context are understandings of what the 
constitutional provision did not authorize. Id. 
69 He recognizes only two areas of possible counterexamples, both 
having to do with “powers” rather than rights. One involves the contracts 
clause and the other the declaration-of-war clause. Id. at 67-68. 
70 RUBENFELD, supra note 66, at 14-15. 
71 Id. at 16. 
72 Id. at 32. 
73 Id. 
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warrants.74 According to Rubenfeld, it also provided the general 
source for expansion into areas not covered at the time of the 
framing through a general principle derived from it: “that the 
Fourth Amendment stands against unconstrained police 
discretion and unjustified intrusions into personal privacy.”75 He 
continues: 
By contrast, the Fourth Amendment’s No-Application 
Understandings have been systematically forgotten. 
For example, as Akhil Amar has emphasized, one of 
the most important original understandings of the 
Fourth Amendment was that it did not generally 
prohibit warrantless searches or seizures. The 
Amendment was intended to limit the issuance of 
warrants, which were viewed with suspicion because 
they immunized searches and seizures from 
subsequent attack in court. . . . Today, [this] No-
Application Understanding has been jettisoned. 
Modern Fourth Amendment doctrine holds that 
warrantless searches are presumptively 
unconstitutional . . . .76 
Case law on self-incrimination under the Fifth Amendment 
has followed a similar pattern. The detail of the original 
understanding is obscure and unknown, and “all we know with 
certainty about the historical meaning of the privilege is its 
foundational paradigm case: the practice of interrogating an 
accused under oath while threatening harsh sanctions against him 
for refusal to answer.”77 
There are problems, however, in applying the abhorrence of 
                                                          
74 Id. 
75 RUBENFELD, supra note 64, at 33. 
76 Id. at 33. Professor Donald Dripps provides a telling critique, not of 
Amar’s central conclusion regarding the importance of the general warrant, 
but of the complexity of how to interpret that history in the light of changed 
circumstance of the Fourteenth Amendment that applied the right to the 
states, and the failure of tort remedies in this new environment. See Donald 
Dripps, Akhil Amar on Criminal Procedure and Constitutional Law: “Here I 
Go Down that Wrong Road Again,” 74 N.C. L. REV. 1559 (1996). 
77 RUBENFELD, supra note 64, at 33. 
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the core concern represented by the historical practice of 
“‘subjecting those charged with crime to the cruel trilemma of 
self-accusation, perjury or contempt’ that defined the operation 
of the Star Chamber.”78 To control custodial police 
interrogation, modern self-incrimination doctrine must leap over 
some substantial historical barriers. The suspect arrested and 
interrogated by the police would not have been viewed as 
“remotely comparable to the Star Chamber scenario” where the 
oath was considered critical because he faced eternal damnation 
if he perjured himself.79 Indeed, the historical evidence indicates 
that questioning not done under oath was not prohibited by the 
privilege against self-incrimination.80 Professor Yale Kamisar 
notes a further problem. The arrested and interrogated suspect is 
not under compulsion in a form historically recognized, which 
was understood to be legal compulsion, since “he was 
threatened neither with perjury for testifying falsely nor 
contempt for refusing to testify at all.”81 Thus, the interrogation 
situation is a No-Application Understanding, but Miranda82 
nonetheless rests on the Fifth Amendment.83 
Another example of the expansion of rights in modern 
constitutional criminal procedure contrary to historical 
understandings in the Sixth Amendment itself is the right to 
counsel discussed in Johnson v. Zerbst84 and Gideon v. 
Wainwright.85 To modern lawyers, the pattern of the right to 
counsel in England prior to the middle of the nineteenth century, 
from which the United States departed, is positively bizarre. 
                                                          
78 Id. at 34 (quoting Pennsylvania v. Muniz, 496 U.S. 582, 596 (1990)). 
79 Id. at 34-35. 
80 See John H. Langbein, The Historical Origins of the Privilege Against 
Self-Incrimination at Common Law, 92 MICH. L. REV. 1047, 1079-80 n.142 
(1994). 
81 YALE KAMISAR, POLICE INTERROGATION AND CONFESSION 37 (1980). 
82 384 U.S. 436 (1966). 
83 Id. at 458 (claiming an “intimate connection between the [Fifth 
Amendment’s] privilege against compulsory and police custodial questing,” 
upon which the Miranda remedy rests). 
84 304 U.S. 458 (1938). 
85 372 U.S. 335 (1963). 
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In ordinary criminal cases, the right to counsel was restricted 
to the right of an individual, not to be appointed counsel, but to 
be represented by retained counsel of his choice.86 However, 
even that limited right was seemingly turned on its head as 
compared to our conception, which grants counsel in serious 
cases rather than minor cases. In contrast, English practice only 
clearly allowed a defendant to be represented by retained 
counsel in misdemeanor cases, while in felony cases, most of 
which were at least nominally capital cases, the defendant was 
prohibited from retaining counsel.87 The difficulty of defending 
this position, which was based on the theory that the court was a 
neutral in criminal trials where charges were generally brought 
by private individuals, led to judicial exceptions such as the 
right of counsel to argue legal points and frequently to take 
other actions as well.88 
The specific history of the right to counsel in the framing 
process is extremely limited and not terribly helpful. What does 
seem clear is that the constitutional provision was intended to 
give defendants the right to bring their retained counsel into 
court to represent them in all federal criminal cases.89 In United 
States v. Gonzalez-Lopez,90 Justice Scalia stated that the “right 
to select counsel of one’s choice . . . has been regarded as the 
root meaning of the constitutional guarantee.”91 He contrasts this 
                                                          
86 See generally WILLIAM M. BEANEY, THE RIGHT TO COUNSEL IN 
AMERICAN COURTS 8-9 (1955). The exception was the right to two appointed 
counsel in cases of treason, which was granted through legislation in 1695. 
Id. at 9. 
87 Id. at 8-9. 
88 Id. at 9-11 (noting that, although practices differed between individual 
cases, defense counsel was permitted to perform an increasing number of 
functions during the eighteenth century, which sometimes included direct and 
cross-examination, but was consistently barred from addressing the jury at the 
conclusion of the evidence). 
89 Id. at 32 (stating that “[t]he constitutional provision meant, at a 
minimum, that defendants in federal courts had the right to retain their own 
counsel”). 
90 126 S. Ct. 2557 (2006). 
91 Id. at 2563. In support of this proposition, which seems clearly 
correct, he cites Wheat v. United States, 486 U.S. 153, 159 (1988); Andersen 
MOSTELLER.DOC 9/4/2007 10:41 PM 
 CONFRONTATION AS CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 709 
core meaning from other aspects of the right that are “derived 
from the Sixth Amendment’s purpose of ensuring a fair trial.”92 
Earlier in that opinion, Scalia first articulated and then 
rejected the distinction between the core right and the right 
based on fairness of the trial in a way that reflects his view of 
the Confrontation Clause. He acknowledged the government’s 
point that the rights within the Sixth Amendment have the 
purpose of ensuring a fair trial, but rejected any implication that 
specific guarantees could be disregarded if the trial was fair on 
the whole. He stated his point as follows: 
What the Government urges upon us here is what was 
urged upon us (successfully, at one time . . .) with 
regard to the Sixth Amendment’s right of 
confrontation—a line of reasoning that “abstracts 
from the right to its purposes, and then eliminates the 
right.” Since, it was argued, the purpose of the 
Confrontation Clause was to ensure reliability of 
evidence, so long as the testimony hearsay bore 
“indicia of reliability,” the Confrontation Clause was 
not violated.93 
Something on the order of the confrontation right as 
recognized in Crawford as part of the core meaning of the 
Confrontation Clause, and in Professor Rubenfeld’s terminology, 
it is an Application Understanding entitled to recognition as a 
paradigm case. In contrast to Rubenfeld’s observation that with 
rare exceptions Supreme Court decisions have honored 
Application Understandings, the Court initially got this one 
wrong. While I am not yet convinced that either the paradigm 
case is accurately covered as a testimonial statement,94 or that if 
                                                          
v. Treat, 172 U.S. 24 (1898), makes a general reference to BEANEY, supra 
note, at 18-24, 27-33, and a “cf” citation to Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 
45, 53 (1932). 
92 United States v. Gonzalez-Lopez, 126 S. Ct. at 2563. 
93 Id. at 2562 (quoting Maryland v. Craig, 497 U.S. 836, 862 (1990) 
(Scalia, J., dissenting)). 
94 I have argued elsewhere that the concept of “accusatory” statements 
has some historical basis and either as a supplement or an alternative would 
be useful in defining statements within the core area of concern of the 
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covered the nomenclature of “testimonial” is accurately 
descriptive,95 Crawford makes an important correction in giving 
vigor to the confrontation right as a procedural right when core 
values are concerned. Scalia’s point quoted above is thus largely 
accurate and quite telling. The core procedural right was 
abstracted to a principle of fairness–here reliability–and in that 
amorphous form, it was ineffective in providing protection even 
to core cases. 
Having corrected the paradigm case does not at all mean, 
however, that abstracting the right as part of an extension to 
                                                          
Confrontation Clause. See Mosteller, supra note 6, at 16-17, 747-49. 
However, if the Davis opinion is a guide, the Court seems uninterested in 
using such terminology to describe the invigorated core of confrontation 
despite being given substantial opportunity to do so. The brief for Petitioner 
Hammon contained some version of “accuse” or “accusation” over one 
hundred times; the brief for Petitioner Davis presented this terminology over 
seventy times. Brief for Petitioner in Davis v. Washington, No. 05-5224; 
Brief for Petitioner in Hammon v. Indiana, No. 055705. And the concept I 
have advocated regarding accusatory statements to police officers was 
specifically presented by Professor Friedman in oral argument as Hammon’s 
counsel. Transcript of Oral Argument in Hammon v. Indiana, No. 05-5705, 
at 27 (March 20, 2006). However, Justice Scalia did not embrace either the 
limited version regarding police officers or more generally ascribe utility to 
accusatory statements in describing or defining the scope of the Confrontation 
Clause. His opinion in Davis did not use the terms “accusatorial,” 
“accusatory,” or “accusation” a single time, Davis, 126 S. Ct. at 2270-81, 
and Justice Thomas uses “accusers” only to describe the historical practices 
under the Marian Statutes, where that category of individuals had special 
place. Id. at 2281, 2282 (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
95 As the definition of “testimonial” statements was further developed in 
Davis it appears to me more sensible, but less “testimonial.” Scalia moves 
the focus of whose perspective matters from that of the speaker to that of the 
questioner, and he diminishes the importance of the formality of the 
statement. See Mosteller, supra note 6, at 7-9. It appears sufficient that the 
statement be secured in a non-emergency situation by a known investigative 
officer for the purpose of establishing a past fact. Davis, 126 S. Ct. at 2278, 
n.5. That is quite far from what “testimonial” would appear to convey and, 
as Justice Thomas noted in his dissent, not what was indicated by the initial 
statement of the concept in White v. Illinois. Davis, 126 S. Ct. at 2282-83 
(Thomas, J., dissenting) (citing his definition of “testimonial” in White, 502 
U.S. at 365 (Thomas, J., concurring). The current form is, I believe, 
superior, but it would likely be better described by other terminology. 
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cover No-Application Understandings is wrong. That is in 
essence what the Court did in Johnson v. Zerbst and Gideon v. 
Wainwright under the Sixth Amendment’s right to counsel. 
First, in Johnson, the court interpreted the Sixth 
Amendment, not historically, but as a guarantee of fairness.96 
Then, in Gideon, through the language of fundamental rights 
essential to a fair trial, the Court declared that the Sixth and 
Fourteenth Amendments guaranteed the right to appointment of 
counsel in the states as to all felonies because such a right was 
essential to a fair trial.97 
                                                          
96 The Court in declaring the defendant to have been denied his Sixth 
Amendment right when not offered appointed counsel stated: 
The Sixth Amendment stands as a constant admonition that if the 
constitutional safeguards it provides be lost, justice will not “still 
be done.” It embodies a realistic recognition of the obvious truth 
that the average defendant does not have the professional legal 
skill to protect himself when brought before a tribunal with 
power to take his life or liberty, wherein the prosecution is 
presented by experienced and learned counsel. That which is 
simple, orderly, and necessary to the lawyer—to the untrained 
layman—may appear intricate, complex, and mysterious. 
Consistently with the wise policy of the Sixth Amendment and 
other parts of our fundamental charter, this Court has pointed to 
“. . . the humane policy of the modern criminal law . . .” which 
now provides that a defendant “. . . if he be poor, . . . may 
have counsel furnished him by the state, . . . not 
infrequently . . . more able than the attorney for the state.” 
304 U.S. at 462-63. The language is of fairness in a modern age. 
97 Justice Black stated: 
The right of one charged with crime to counsel may not be 
deemed fundamental and essential to fair trials in some 
countries, but it is in ours. From the very beginning, our state 
and national constitutions and laws have laid great emphasis on 
procedural and substantive safeguards designed to assure fair 
trials before impartial tribunals in which every defendant stands 
equal before the law. This noble ideal cannot be realized if the 
poor man charged with crime has to face his accusers without a 
lawyer to assist him. A defendant’s need for a lawyer is 
nowhere better stated than in the moving words of Mr. Justice 
Sutherland in Powell v. Alabama: “The right to be heard would 
be, in many cases, of little avail if it did not comprehend the 
MOSTELLER.DOC 9/4/2007 10:41 PM 
712 JOURNAL OF LAW AND POLICY 
It is hardly irrational to derive from the Confrontation 
Clause’s procedural guarantee that defendants may test witness’ 
testimony, whose purpose is to ensure fairness and reliability, 
the principle that the confrontation right is concerned with 
ensuring reliability or trustworthiness in evidence. Outside the 
core area of protection, a guarantee that helps force 
confrontation or excludes particularly problematic hearsay 
statements from a person whom the defendant cannot confront is 
well in line with the additional types of protections guaranteed in 
other areas of constitutional criminal procedure. It cannot be 
said that such a right is historically grounded, but as noted 
above, such extrapolation from the historical core is in good 
company. Moreover, such protection does not threaten in any 
fashion the core procedural right Crawford guarantees. 
III.  AMBIGUITY IN THE MAJOR HISTORICAL ANTECEDENT TO THE 
CONFRONTATION RIGHT 
The treason trial of Sir Walter Raleigh is cited by Justice 
Scalia as one of the major historical events that was known to 
the Framers and that influenced their fashioning of the 
Confrontation Clause.98 In telling of this event, Scalia 
emphasizes the admission of certain hearsay that fits his 
                                                          
right to be heard by counsel. Even the intelligent and educated 
layman has small and sometimes no skill in the science of law. 
If charged with crime, he is incapable, generally, of determining 
for himself whether the indictment is good or bad. He is 
unfamiliar with the rules of evidence. Left without the aid of 
counsel he may be put on trial without a proper charge, and 
convicted upon incompetent evidence, or evidence irrelevant to 
the issue or otherwise inadmissible. He lacks both the skill and 
knowledge adequately to prepare his defense, even though he 
have a perfect one. He requires the guiding hand of counsel at 
every step in the proceedings against him. Without it, though he 
be not guilty, he faces the danger of conviction because he does 
not know how to establish his innocence.” 
372 U.S. at 344-45 (citing 287 U.S. 45, 68-69 (1932)). Again, this is 
language of fairness. 
98 Crawford, 541 U.S. at 44, 50. 
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testimonial model. However, other hearsay was also admitted 
against Raleigh, which is almost certainly nontestimonial. That 
latter hearsay, which could suggest a broader confrontation 
right, is omitted. Scalia’s very narrow, clear, and definitive 
account of the story amounts to a selective recitation that 
arguably produces an erroneously narrow confrontation doctrine. 
In the Raleigh story, there are “testimonial statements,” as 
Scalia characterizes them, that might well have concerned the 
Framers. Scalia cites the use of a letter by Lord Cobham as 
proof not only of the Framers’ concern, but also of the specific 
construction that should be given to the Confrontation Clause. 
On the question of whether interrogation is required, he states in 
Davis with apparent total confidence based on the use of this 
letter that the “Framers were no more willing to exempt from 
cross-examination volunteered testimony or answers to open-
ended questions than they were to exempt answers to detailed 
interrogation.”99 This assertion reflects remarkable certainty and 
selectivity. 
On the other hand, Raleigh protested the admission of other 
hearsay, which appears almost certainly not to be testimonial 
under Scalia’s construction of the term, but it is unnoticed and 
unmentioned in the historical accounts in both Crawford and 
Davis. It is difficult to understand the origin of this certainty that 
the Framers were not concerned about that other, arguably even 
more outrageous, hearsay. The omitted part of the Raleigh story 
challenges the clarity of Scalia’s version of history and his 
confident assertions that the Framers had only a core 
constitutional concern with regard to testimonial statements.100 
The other hearsay also illustrates a further ambiguity, which 
is the subject of the next section. It involves the “translation” of 
history into its contemporary constitutional meaning and the 
                                                          
99 126 S. Ct. 2274 at n.1. 
100 If the core constitutional concern were not only with the narrow class 
of testimonial statements necessarily defined by Crawford (i.e.. “prior 
testimony at a preliminary hearing, before a grand jury, or at a former trial; 
and to police interrogations,” Crawford, 541 U.S. at 68), but defined the 
core to include “accusatory” statements as well, both types of complaints in 
the Raleigh story would fit. 
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interaction between the development and understanding of 
hearsay law at the time of the framing of the Bill of Rights as 
compared to its definition and admissibility today. It also 
explores how those differences would have impacted the 
Framers’ intentions for the Clause and how the earlier different 
treatment of hearsay should affect our interpretation of the role 
of historical meaning as applied to an altered, modern setting. 
Scalia concentrates on Lord Cobham, who gave several 
statements to members of the Privy Council and who wrote two 
incriminating letters to the Council regarding the case. Raleigh 
insisted on, but was denied, the right to confront Cobham. 
Scalia focuses exclusively on this aspect of the story. 
There was a witness produced against Raleigh, one Dyer, 
who did not provide his own firsthand accusations against 
Raleigh but rather recounted the accusations of another person, 
who was not identified by name and did not testify. Dyer, a ship 
pilot who had been in Lisbon, Portugal during the time of the 
alleged conspiracy to topple the king, testified: 
Being at Lisbon, there came to me a Portugal 
gentlemen who asked me how the King of England 
did, and whether he was crowned? I answered him 
that I hoped our noble King was well and crowned by 
this, but the time was not come when I came from 
the coast for Spain. “Nay,” said he, “your King shall 
never be crowned, for Don Cobham and Don Raleigh 
will cut his throat before he come to be crowned.”  
 Sir W. Raleigh: This is the saying of some wild 
Jesuit or beggarly Priest; but what proof is it against 
me? 
 Attorney General [Sir Edward Coke]: It must per 
force arise out of some preceding intelligence, and 
shows that your treason had wings. 
 Sir W. Raleigh: If Cobham did practise with 
Aremberg, how could it but be known in Spain? Why 
did they name the Duke of Buckingham in Jack 
Straw’s Rebellion, and the Duke of York in Jack 
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Cade’s, but to give countenance to the treasons?101 
Professor Myrna Raeder has noted the significance of this 
statement. She argues that, in terms of the historical record, 
both Cobham’s hearsay and that of the Portuguese gentlemen 
were received in Raleigh’s trial, and asks why we should not be 
then concerned with both.102 She assumes, correctly in my 
judgment, that the second type of hearsay might not be covered 
by the testimonial concept since it was “made to a private 
individual, but was clearly accusatory, either from the 
perspective of the declarant or a reasonable observer.”103 
Writing long before Crawford was decided, Professor Roger 
Park noted that, even if the Raleigh trial had a major impact on 
the Framers, it is ambiguous in providing guidance on the scope 
of the Confrontation Clause. If intended to prohibit the conduct 
in Raleigh’s trial, the accusations of Cobham should not be 
admitted. Professor Park suggests “that anonymous rumors from 
                                                          
101 JARDINE, supra note 15, at 436. The testimony is recited with slight 
differences in Howell’s State Trials. The exchange is given as follows: 
 Dyer: I came to a merchant’s house in Lisbon, to see a boy 
that I had there; there came a gentleman into the house, and 
enquiring what countryman I was, I said, an Englishman. 
Whereupon he asked me, if the king was crowned? And I 
answered, No, but that I hoped he should be so shortly. Nay, 
saith he, he shall never be crowned; for Don Raleigh and Don 
Cobham will cut his throat ere that day come. 
 Raleigh: What infer you upon this? 
 Att: That your treason had wings. 
 Raleigh: If Cobham did practise with Aremberg, how could 
it not but be known in Spain? Why did they name the duke of 
Buckingham with Jack Straw’s Treason, and the duke of York 
with Jack Cade, but that it was to countenance his Treason? 
Consider, you Gentlemen of the Jury, there is no cause so 
doubtful which the king’s counsel cannot make good against the 
law. Consider my disability, and their ability: they prove 
nothing against me, only they bring the Accusation of my Lord 
Cobham, which he has lamented . . . . 
2  STATE TRIALS 25 (T.B. Howell ed., T.C. Hansard 1816). 
102 Myrna Raeder, Remember the Ladies and the Children Too, 71 
BROOK. L. REV. 311, 318 (2005). 
103 Id. at 319. 
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declarants without personal knowledge should be excluded as 
well.”104 
Raleigh was not a lawyer and was not permitted to have an 
attorney in his treason trial. Thus, it is unfair to hold him to the 
legal knowledge of the time, particularly in responding 
immediately to the accusation from Dyer, which he likely did 
not know would be produced. However, several scholars have 
interpreted Raleigh’s response as an objection not to the lack of 
confrontation but rather, at least initially, to the insignificance of 
the statement. Professor Kenneth Graham sees Raleigh’s 
response as going to “weight rather than admissibility,”105 and 
Professor Robert Pitler notes the lack of complaint about 
confrontation, which he suggests alternatively might have been 
due to the fact that Raleigh was arguing instead the absence of 
probative value, or because he may have sensed the testimonial 
statement distinction—a difference between a private person’s 
statement and “government secured, ex-parte examined 
statements.”106 
One may reasonably argue that Dyer’s hearsay has limited 
importance because the evidence is weak. Indeed, in Raleigh’s 
initial summation to the jury, he stated that “[f]or all that is said 
to the contrary, you see my only accuser is the Lord 
Cobham . . . .”107 However, Professor Graham notes that 
                                                          
104 Roger Park, A Subject Matter Approach to Hearsay, 86 MICH. L. 
REV. 51, 90 (1987). 
105 Kenneth W. Graham, Jr., The Right of Confrontation and the 
Hearsay Rule: Sir Walter Raleigh Loses Another One, 8 CRIM. L. BULL. 99, 
101 (1972). 
106 Robert M. Pitler, Introduction, 71 BROOK L. REV. 1, 8n.28 (2005). I 
take modest issues with one of Professor Pitler’s suggestions, or at least do 
so from the perspective of those who are firmly convinced Scalia is 
recounting a view of the Clause clearly known to the Framers and their 
progenitors. Professor Pitler suggests that noting this distinction between 
testimonial and nontestimonial statements would have been “prescient.” 
Those who claim the distinction to be the clear interpretation of what I 
believe is a murky historical record would say, I believe, that Raleigh was 
merely observing that distinction, which was obvious to those in Raleigh’s 
time and as to the Framers, and to us now after Crawford. 
107 JARDINE, supra note 15, at 441. 
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despite the fact that his contemporaries thought none of the 
evidence proved Raleigh’s guilt, he was still convicted.108 The 
fact that he was convicted on what is argued to be inadequate 
evidence does not inspire confidence that this hearsay was in 
fact insignificant evidence. Some commentators have observed 
that this was the corroborating evidence that the prosecutor, Sir 
Edward Coke, offered in response to Raleigh’s protestations that 
if Lord Cobham were produced there would be no need for 
corroboration.109 
Given the concentration of attention on the accusation of 
Lord Cobham both by Raleigh and by those who have 
commented on the case, I accept that Cobham’s statements were 
likely the central concern of those troubled by the lack of 
confrontation in Raleigh’s case. Dyer’s recitation of the 
accusations of the Portugese gentleman was, however, also there 
as part of the historical record, and no commentator has 
demonstrated that it was not also of concern to the Framers. 
As Raleigh’s biographer observed, the introduction of Dyer’s 
hearsay was “the crowning absurdity” of the trial.110 Justice 
Scalia’s omission of it from the historical account is surely a 
selective analysis of that history, which carries with it obvious 
dangers of misunderstanding of and lack of appreciation for the 
                                                          
108 Graham, supra note 105, at 101. 
109 Charles R. Nesson & Yochai Benkler, Constitutional Hearsay: 
Requiring Foundation Testing and Corroboration under the Confrontation 
Clause, 81 VA. L. REV. 149, 149 (1995). See also Stephan Landsman, Who 
Needs Evidence Rules, Anyway?, 25 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 635, 646 (1992). 
110 WILLARD M. WALLACE, SIR WALTER RALEIGH 210 (1959). See also 
30 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & KENNETH W. GRAHAM, JR., FEDERAL 
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE: FEDERAL RULES OF EVIDENCE—HEARSAY AND 
CONFRONTATION § 6342, at 268 n.610 (1997) (noting both the weakness of 
the evidence as hearsay evidence in the form of an opinion from a person 
who could not have had personal knowledge, but also recognizing that it was 
cited as absurd in Raleigh’s biography). Wallace stated further: “The case 
against Raleigh was falling of its own flimsiness when the prosecution 
attached significance to such evidence.” WALLACE, supra note 110, at 210. 
But again there is discord between the position that the case was falling apart 
and the fact that Raleigh was convicted, and the real possibility that evidence 
mattered to the conviction. 
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full range of the Framers’ concerns. 
IV.  APPLICATION OF ORIGINALISM IN A CHANGED WORLD: THE 
PROBLEM OF KNOWING AND TRANSLATING 
In his concurrence and dissent in Crawford, Chief Justice 
Rehnquist cited an aspect of an article that I had written in 
support of his argument that it is difficult to apply the historical 
understanding regarding confrontation from a world with a very 
different treatment of hearsay to the modern day.111 Rehnquist 
was arguing that unsworn statements made to police officers, 
such as those offered in Crawford, would not have been 
admitted in evidence at the time of the framing because they 
were not made under oath, a safeguard the absence of which 
bars admission of the hearsay as well as the additional 
consideration of it under the right of confrontation.112 
Rehnquist argued that any classification of particularly 
suspect statements beyond that of sworn affidavits and 
depositions, such as Scalia makes, is somewhat arbitrary since 
unsworn statements were treated no differently than 
nontestimonial statements, and there was no special concern with 
a broad category of testimonial but unsworn statements.113 He 
objected to this “mere proxy for what the Framers might have 
intended had such evidence been liberally admitted as 
substantive evidence like it is today.”114 Scalia responded: 
Any attempt to determine the application of a 
constitutional provision to a phenomenon that did not 
exist at the time of its adoption (here, allegedly, 
admissible unsworn testimony) involves some degree 
of estimation—what the Chief Justice calls use of a 
“proxy,” . . . but that is hardly a reason not to make 
                                                          
111 Crawford, 541 U.S. at 69, n.1 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring in 
judgment and dissenting from analysis). The article is Remaking 
Confrontation Clause and Hearsay Doctrine Under the Challenge of Child 
Sexual Abuse Prosecutions, supra note 43, at 738-46. 
112 Id. at 70-71. 
113 Id. at 71. 
114 Id. 
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the estimation as accurate as possible. Even if, as The 
Chief Justice mistakenly asserts, there was no direct 
evidence of how the Sixth Amendment originally 
applied to unsworn testimony, there is no doubt what 
its application would have been.115 
Later in Davis, Scalia made a similar point in rejecting 
Justice Thomas’ argument that the statement to a police officer 
in the field was not sufficiently formal, unlike the depositions 
taken by Marian magistrates, which were characterized by a 
high degree of formality. Scalia stated, “restricting the 
Confrontation Clause to the precise forms against which it was 
originally directed is a recipe for its extinction.”116 
Rehnquist uses the term “proxy.” Scalia speaks of 
“estimation.” Still others term this process “translation.”117 
Regardless of the label, this is the process by which the original 
purpose is effectuated in a changed and changing world.118 As 
Scalia’s use of it indicates, it is a tool that at least modestly 
flexible originalists can use.119 
This process, which I will call translation, is obviously 
necessary unless the Constitution is to become irrelevant to 
modern life. It is, nonetheless, fraught with great difficulty and 
uncertainty unless one has the ability to “channel” the 
Framers.120 With respect to confrontation, one must first 
                                                          
115 Id. at 52 n.3. 
116 Davis, 126 S. Ct. at 2278 n.5. 
117 See Lessig, supra note 62. 
118 RUBENFELD, supra note 64, at 9. 
119 See also Lessig, supra note 62, at 1167-68 (discussing “translation” 
as a tool of originalist interpretation). 
120 Although such translation is, I believe, almost always difficult, it is 
particularly difficult in some situations where the world is so different that it 
is virtually impossible to imagine what the Framers would have thought of 
the new environment. The Fourth Amendment appears to be one of those 
almost impossible situations, although creative authors can and do draw 
interesting insights that they present with an enormous number of caveats. 
See, e.g., Thomas Y. Davies, Recovering the Original Fourth Amendment, 
98 MICH. L. REV. 547 (1999); George C. Thomas III, Time Travel, 
Hovercrafts, and the Framers: James Madison Sees the Future and Rewrites 
the Fourth Amendment, 80 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1451 (2005). 
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determine what the law of confrontation was at the time of the 
framing, which can be complicated by its interaction with 
hearsay restrictions. Then, one must determine what the Framers 
knew about the law,121 and ascertain how the provision adopted 
was designed to remedy whatever problem was perceived. 
Finally, moving to the process of translation, one needs to 
determine how best to effectuate the Framers’ intentions in a 
changed context. 
I contend that the difficulty of knowing for certain how this 
translation should operate is another reason why Roberts should 
have been permitted to operate outside the core area of concern. 
The Court may well have picked a slightly inaccurate tool—the 
testimonial statement concept—to effectuate the intent of the 
Framers, running the risk that in the process of giving a detailed 
definition to the term it may make mistakes of translation. 
The Court has twice refused to give a comprehensive 
definition of testimonial statements. If history and translation 
offered a clear definition, surely the Court would have set out 
that rule. But obviously an enormous number of legitimate 
questions are not answered and if honestly treated cannot be 
definitively decided. 
For example, we do not yet know if the government must 
have a role in creating the statement, and if it does, whether the 
speaker must know he or she is talking to a government agent. 
We do not yet know whether the intention involved must be 
                                                          
121 Professor Davies argues, (1) that much of what Justice Scalia says 
about the law at the time the Confrontation Clause was proposed and adopted 
is in error, and (2) that particularly as to what the English law that Scalia 
cites was at the critical time, the Framers would have had great difficulty 
knowing it. See generally Thomas Y. Davies, What Did the Framers Know, 
and When Did they Know It? Fictional Originalism in Crawford v. 
Washington, 71 BROOK. L. REV. 105 (2005). See also generally Thomas Y. 
Davies, Not “The Framers’ Design:” How the Framing Era Ban Against 
Hearsay Evidence Refutes the Crawford-Davis “Testimonial” Formulation of 
the Scope of the Original Confrontation Clause, 15 J.L. & POL’Y 349 (2007). 
Whether one accepts each of the points that Davies makes or not, the 
accumulation of evidence that he provides for inaccuracy in understanding the 
law from a different era and the difficulty of attributing questionable 
knowledge to the Framers is to my examination extremely persuasive. 
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viewed from the perspective of the speaker or of the government 
agent. We do not yet know what type of formality is required. 
The list of unknowns is not unlimited, but it is lengthy and 
includes many questions of substantial importance. While history 
gives us clues as to these answers, it yields very few certainties. 
Moreover, even as to statements that are not testimonial, it is 
unclear how the Framers would have reacted to a modern world 
where, as Rehnquist noted, hearsay is much more admissible 
and ordinarily given weight that likely would have appeared 
foreign to the Framers.122 For example, in Crawford, Scalia 
states that the spontaneous declaration exception was much 
narrower at the time of the framing than it is today.123 
The Framers therefore could not have contemplated whether 
the Confrontation Clause should apply to the vast range of 
excited utterances that are today introduced with great frequency 
and with apparently persuasive impact because most of those 
statements would have been inadmissible in the Framers’ world 
on hearsay grounds. The Court suggested that the spontaneous 
declaration made to a police officer in White v. Illinois124 might 
be excluded as a testimonial statement,125 but would the Framers 
have excluded such statements made to family members as well? 
We cannot know because it is unclear that the law permitted 
admission of either at the time of the framing. 
Therefore, we may only make a realistic and appropriately 
modest claim about our ability to know what information was 
available to the Framers, their understanding of it, and their 
intentions, and then attempt to translate and properly apply such 
                                                          
122 Rehnquist contended that, although courts were inconsistent, “out-of-
court statements made by someone other than the accused and not taken 
under oath, unlike ex parte depositions or affidavits, were generally not 
considered substantive evidence upon which a conviction could be based.” 
Crawford, 541 U.S. at 69 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring in the judgment and 
dissenting from the analysis). 
123 Crawford, 541 U.S. at 58 n.8 (stating that to be admissible the 
statement needed to be “immediat[ely] upon the hurt received,” (quoting 
Thompson v. Trevanion, Skin. 402, 90 Eng. Rep. 179 (K.B. 1693)). 
124 502 U.S. at 349-51. 
125 Crawford, 541 U.S. at 58 n.8. 
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understandings to modern practices. These limitations call for a 
weaker additional system, such as that set forth in Roberts, to 
screen problematic hearsay. The statement may be regarded as 
suspect either because it is facially unreliable or because it is 
only barely outside the definition of testimonial statements, and 
in either situation, the defendant lacked the procedural protection 
of an opportunity to confront the witness against him. 
CONCLUSION 
The Roberts approach, as developed and weakened by later 
Supreme Court decisions, provided incomplete protection of the 
confrontation right. However, as to the troubling hearsay 
presented in Wright,126 it proved adequate to exclude the 
hearsay. As noted earlier, where the Framers established a 
procedural protection to help ensure the reliability of evidence 
by face-to-face confrontation and cross-examination, it is hardly 
ridiculous to have a residual protection where face-to-face 
confrontation and cross-examination are not afforded to test 
facially unreliable statements (the functional equivalent of a 
witness) admitted against the accused. Crawford was right to 
note that judges were not to be entrusted with admitting the most 
historical suspect statements simply because the judge believed 
the statement to be reliable. The Framers feared judges could 
not be broadly trusted to protect individual rights,127 and 
                                                          
126 The hearsay involved accusatory statements by a young child solicited 
by a pediatrician using suggestive questions. Id. at 826. Wright does not 
stand alone. One area where Roberts has been used reasonably frequently to 
exclude problematic hearsay involves statements of children in sexual abuse 
cases. See Robert P. Mosteller, The Maturation and Disintegration of the 
Hearsay Exception for Statements for Medical Examination in Child Sexual 
Abuse Cases, 65 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 47, 84-85 (Winter 2002) 
(examining treatment of federal circuits under Roberts in child sexual abuse 
cases and noting Eighth Circuit’s particular concern where no treatment 
interest is shown by the child). 
127 The Court described the Framers’ distrust of judges as follows: 
We have no doubt that the courts below were acting in utmost 
good faith when they found reliability. The Framers, however, 
would not have been content to indulge this assumption. They 
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therefore it was theoretically and factually correct to fear that 
judges would do a poor job in providing protection through their 
ad hoc approach to reliability. However, charging judges with 
the duty to exclude particularly unreliable hearsay that has not 
been confronted as supplemental protection was no more 
prohibited by the Framers than Miranda. Roberts did nothing to 
harm the core protection that Crawford and Davis describe and 
begin to define. 
Roberts is gone, and with it almost certainly, is Wright. 
They were, however, in good company with other aspects of 
contemporary constitutional criminal procedure that, although 
inconsistent with originalist analysis, remain valid doctrine. 
Roberts and Wright should have been permitted to continue to 
“live” within the federal Confrontation Clause and to provide 
their modest but important supplemental protection. Perhaps 
some part of their sound functional concept that highly 
problematic hearsay should be subject either to confrontation or 
to an examination as to reliability will find a home elsewhere. 
Unfortunately, the protection of the Confrontation Clause of the 
Sixth Amendment is to be determined solely by interpretation of 
the word “testimonial.” 
                                                          
knew that judges, like other government officers, could not 
always be trusted to safeguard the rights of the people; the likes 
of the dread Lord Jeffreys were not yet too distant a memory. 
They were loath to leave too much discretion in judicial 
hands. . . . By replacing categorical constitutional guarantees 
with open-ended balancing tests, we do violence to their design. 
Vague standards are manipulable, and, while that might be a 
small concern in run-of-the-mill assault prosecutions like this 
one, the Framers had an eye toward politically charged cases 
like Raleigh’s⎯great state trials where the impartiality of even 
those at the highest levels of the judiciary might not be so clear. 
It is difficult to imagine Roberts’ providing any meaningful 
protection in those circumstances. 
Crawford, 541 U.S. at 67-68. 
